William & Mary Business Law Review
Volume 10 (2018-2019)
Issue 2

Article 7

February 2019

The Failed Promise of Mental Health Parity in Virginia: A Missing
Key in Mental Healthcare Access
Zachary Woerner

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Insurance Law Commons

Repository Citation
Zachary Woerner, The Failed Promise of Mental Health Parity in Virginia: A Missing Key in
Mental Healthcare Access, 10 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 549 (2019),
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr/vol10/iss2/7
Copyright c 2019 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr

THE FAILED PROMISE OF MENTAL HEALTH
PARITY IN VIRGINIA: A MISSING KEY IN MENTAL
HEALTHCARE ACCESS
ZACHARY WOERNER*
ABSTRACT
For those who suffer from the most serious mental illnesses,
access to mental healthcare is critically important, but often frustrated by a Byzantine insurance system. The goal of this Note is to
sift through the various mental health insurance parity laws, both
nationally and statewide, and determine where this system breaks
down. The Note will argue that lack of enforcement of parity laws
plays a critical role in much of the dysfunction in the marketplace.
Legislation in Virginia and elsewhere is not always deficient
on its face. Instead, laws critically lack regulators willing or able
to implement them. This creates insidious problems in the mental
healthcare market. The first place to begin enforcement is at the
state level, where insurance regulation primarily occurs.
The President’s Commission on Combating Drug Addiction
and the Opioid Crisis recently recognized the need for greater enforcement of parity laws at the federal level as well. Although this
Commission is primarily concerned with substance use disorders,
it recognizes the crucial role that the Department of Labor has in
enforcing federal parity laws. The DOL currently lacks the tools it
needs to enforce these laws. It is encouraging that the Commission’s
Final Report recognizes this. Federal recognition of the problem is
crucial, and increased enforcement could generate positive results
for access to care throughout the country.

* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, Class of 2019. The author
would like to thank his friends and family for their support during this process. This Note is dedicated to Jake Woerner. Thanks also to Katie Rockwell,
Jessica Fetzer, and the staff of the William & Mary Business Law Review for
their help in developing this Note.
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INTRODUCTION
Of the forty-three million American adults with some form
of mental illness, ten million sufferers’ are afflicted with a serious
mental illness (SMI).1 Out of that ten million, 140,000 of the seriously mentally ill are homeless; 392,037 are imprisoned; and
755,360 are on probation or parole.2 Meanwhile, 95,000 seriously
mentally ill persons who need hospitalization cannot find beds, and
5,000 kill themselves annually.3 These numbers are staggering, but
do not fully represent the suffering felt by the mentally ill, their
families, and society.4 And yet, the solutions proposed to address
these seemingly intractable problems are all too often reactive in
nature—and insufficient to meet the daunting task of reform.5
In Virginia, the problem of access to mental healthcare is
particularly acute.6 In the wake of the Virginia Tech shooting and
DJ JAFFE, INSANE CONSEQUENCES: HOW THE MENTAL HEALTH INDUSTRY
FAILS THE MENTALLY ILL 20 (2017).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 See id. at 68–76 (The symptoms that accompany SMIs include hallucinations, delusions, and hearing voices that can lead to violence. Oftentimes sufferers
also face severe cognitive dysfunction, which can be accompanied by total withdrawal from society. SMIs are physical brain disorders, and many suffer from
anosognosia, meaning that sufferers have no insight into their illness. In addition,
those who have a family member with an SMI are two to three times more likely to
develop depression.); Stacey A. Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal: Reforming Federal Mental Health Insurance Law, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 28, 35–45
(2012) [hereinafter Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal] (“U.S. employers
incur anywhere from $20 billion to $40 billion per year in lost productivity due to
employees’ mental illness.”); Mental Health America, Position Statement 15: Parity
in Health Insurance (Sept. 13, 2014), http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/posi
tions/parity#edn16 [https://perma.cc/NRC9-SY54] (“[I]ndirect costs associated with
mental illness and substance abuse disorders—excess turnover, lost productivity,
absenteeism and disability—commonly meet or exceed the direct treatment costs,
and have been estimated to be as high as $105 billion annually.”).
5 See JAFFE, supra note 1, at 21 (detailing tragedies that have resulted from
violent, untreated seriously mentally ill individuals, such as the Virginia Tech
shooting).
6 See K. Burnell Evans, State official: Without action, Virginia’s public mental
hospitals will overflow by 2024, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Sept. 28, 2017),
http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/government-politics/general-assembly
/state-official-without-action-virginia-s-public-mental-hospitals-will/article924a88
71-a68b-510e-ba6d-98ae9f466e08.html [https://perma.cc/K87T-WPQ6] (describing
1
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the tragedy involving Gus Deeds, Virginia saw two wake up calls
that have led to legislative action and the commitment of more
resources to the problem.7 Reforms came in the wake of Gus Deeds’s
suicide and attempted murder of his father, Virginia State Senator Creigh Deeds.8 On the afternoon of November 18, 2013, Senator Deeds was unable to find his son a hospital bed in the state
of Virginia and Gus was prematurely released from an emergency
custody order.9 Once released, Gus attacked his father and committed suicide.10 This tragedy highlights the problem of access to
adequate mental healthcare for the mentally ill.11 Nevertheless,
responses have been reactive, with a focus on addressing the immediate problems that crises present, such as increasing hospital beds after Senator Deeds was unable to find one, rather than
focusing on systematic defects that create such emergencies in the
first place.12 Such a narrow focus on putting out fires, rather than
the prediction of overflow of Virginia’s state mental hospitals without commitment
of resources, and the hesitancy of some law makers to divert funds to state
institutions, rather than community-based services).
7 See JAFFE, supra note 1, at 21 (The Virginia Tech shooter, Seung-Hui Cho,
suffered from untreated serious mental illness. He killed thirty-two and wounded
seventeen in April 2007.); Editorial Board, On campuses and around Virginia,
we see early signs of awareness and security on mental health, DAILY PRESS
(Apr. 19, 2017), http://www.dailypress.com/news/opinion/editorials/dp-edt-mental
-health-campus-security-0420-20170419-story.html (“There are indications that
our commonwealth is serious about its commitment to improving resources
around the state.”).
8 See Travis Fain, Mental health reforms, and funding requests, emerging
from Deeds study group, DAILY PRESS (Oct. 29, 2016, 8:53 PM), http://www.daily
press.com/news/politics/dp-nws-mental-health-funding-20161026-story.html
[https://perma.cc/4H4V-DZ3S]; David Ress, Signs of hope on mental health 10
years after Tech tragedy, DAILY PRESS (Apr. 15, 2017, 6:50 PM), http://www.daily
press.com/news/politics/dp-nws-va-tech-mental-20170415-story.html (“I believe
the political will is there [to reform and commit additional resources].”).
9 Prue Salasky, Report on Deeds attack details flaws in crisis response, DAILY
PRESS (Mar. 27, 2014, 8:11 PM), http://www.dailypress.com/health/dp-nws-deeds
-report-issued-20140327-story.html [https://perma.cc/JVD5-UV3G].
10 Id.
11 See id.
12 ARADHANA BELA SOOD & ROBERT COHEN, THE VIRGINIA TECH MASSACRE:
STRATEGIES AND CHALLENGES FOR IMPROVING MENTAL HEALTH POLICY ON CAMPUS
AND BEYOND 221 (2015) (“The focus in mental health services continues to be
on reactive approaches, such as crisis stabilization units, rather than on outpatient care delivery or on prevention and health promotion.”).
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looking to the larger causes of those fires, means that insidious
problems such as access to care, shortage of providers, and lack of
resources go unaddressed.13
This Note argues that the source of these problems is a
lack of enforcement of mental health insurance parity laws on
the state and federal level, and that more vigorous enforcement
of parity laws could represent a first step in increasing access to
psychiatrists and other mental health providers. This Note will
focus on the effect of under-enforcement of parity laws on access
to psychiatric care in Virginia and look to examples in other states
to highlight the different approaches being taken in response to
this problem.
Part I of this Note will begin by briefly describing the federal
legislative backdrop to mental health parity, along with its limitations. The Note will proceed to analyze the shared enforcement responsibility of the states and federal government, with an emphasis
on the crucial role that states can play. Part II will identify greater
enforcement of parity legislation on both the state and federal
level as a potential first step in solving the greater issue of access
to mental healthcare across the nation. Part III will detail various
state legislative parity schemes, with a focus on Virginia. The Note
will conclude by examining a promising new approach to enforcement of substance abuse treatment laws in New Jersey that could
represent a critical step in increasing access to mental healthcare
across the country.
I. THE FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE BACKDROP
Parity laws operate on both the state and federal levels.14 Efforts at achieving federal mental health parity began with the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (MHPA).15 MHPA regulated insured
See id. at 221–22.
See Hefei Wen et al., State Parity Laws and Access to Treatment for Substance Use Disorder in the United States, 70 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 1355, 1356
(Oct. 23, 2013).
15 Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, sec. 7, § 712, 110
Stat. 2874 (1996) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2006)). For a detailed discussion of the development of federal mental health parity legislation, see Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal, supra note 4, at 35–45.
13
14
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and self-insured group health plans of non-small employers,16 requiring that the lifetime and annual spending limits that a plan
specifies not be different for physical and mental health benefits.17
For example, if a plan does not impose an aggregate lifetime or
annual limit on covered physical benefits it may not impose such
a limit on offered mental health benefits.18 One shortcoming of this
law is that its protections did not reach people with substance
abuse disorders (SUDs).19 Neither did it require a group health
plan to actually offer any mental health benefits.20
The Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity
and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA) built upon the
MHPA.21 The MHPAEA, like the MHPA, applied to insured and
self-insured group health plans of non-small employers.22 Thus
it “did not apply to small group plans, individual plans, the Medicare Program, Medicaid non-managed care plans, or ... self-funded,
non-federal government plans whose sponsor opted out of
MHPAEA.”23 Like the MHPA, it did not require that insurers offer or provide any mental health benefits, but only applied if the
plan already offered mental health coverage.24
Substantively, it mandated that financial requirements (such
as deductibles, co-pays, co-insurance, and other out-of-pocket expenses) and treatment limitations (inpatient day and outpatient
visit limitations) that group health plans imposed on mental health
See Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal, supra note 4, at 36 (defining “non-small ... as those employers that employ an average of [fifty-one] or
more employees.”).
17 Id. at 37.
18 See id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 36 (“In terms of its substantive provision, MHPA was neither a mandated offer nor a mandated benefit law; that is, nothing in MHPA required a covered group health plan to actually offer or provide any mental health benefits.”).
21 Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction
Equity Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, secs. 511–12, 122 Stat. 3765, 3881–93
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg-26 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)) [hereinafter Wellstone & Domenici].
22 See Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal, supra note 4, at 38.
23 Id.
24 See id. (explaining that MHPAEA was “neither a mandated offer nor a
mandated benefit law”).
16
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and SUD benefits be no more restrictive than those imposed on
physical health benefits.25 Although the law is spotty in terms of
its reach, the MHPAEA represented a major stride forward toward parity on the federal level.26 As of January 13, 2014, the
Final Rules implementing the MHPAEA went into effect.27
Most recently in 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (ACA) expanded many of the protections offered by the
MHPA and MHPAEA.28 The ACA increased the scope of parity:
new ACA-created state insurance exchanges now were also subject
to MHPA and MHPAEA provisions.29 Additionally, the ACA mandates that plans on state-run exchanges offer mental health and
addiction coverage at parity with physical illness coverage.30 This
mandate is a big step because it requires the offer of mental health
and SUD benefits for specified plans including “the exchangeoffered qualified health plan, the non-exchange individual health
plan, the non-exchange small group health plan, the Medicaid
benchmark plan, the benchmark-equivalent plan, and the Medicaid state plan.”31
The surface of these federal legislative advances suggests
substantial progress toward actual parity.32 All told, the MHPAEA
extended parity to 103 million people in large-employer plans, while
the ACA, in extending the application of the MHPAEA, affected
Id.
See Richard G. Frank, Realizing the Promise of Parity Legislation, 74 JAMA
PSYCHIATRY 117, 117 (2017).
27 Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health
Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68, 240 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to
be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 53, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pts. 146–47).
28 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec.
1302(b)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 163 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1) (Supp. V
2012)); Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1305). Collectively, these two laws
are now referred to as the Affordable Care Act. See Tovino, All Illnesses Are
(Not) Created Equal, supra note 4, at 40.
29 Aubrey Chamberlain, Note, Stop the Bleeding: A Call for Clarity to Achieve
True Mental Health Parity, 20 WIDENER L. REV. 253, 259 (2014).
30 Id.
31 See Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal, supra note 4, at 41 (explaining these protections do not reach grandfathered health plans that were
in effect on March 23, 2010, the day the law was signed).
32 See Frank, supra note 26, at 117.
25
26
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an additional 30 million in small group plans, 18 million in the
individual market, and 23 million under Medicaid.33 With the
future of the ACA in jeopardy due to political efforts to unwind
it, these temporary federal gains are fragile.34
Despite this surface-level progress, enforcement of federal
and state parity provisions remains a problem.35 However, some
signs of hope exist. The recently formed President’s Commission
on Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis shows that
parity enforcement, at least for substance abuse treatment, is now
a top priority on the federal level.36
A. The Burden of Enforcement: State and Federal Legislative
Dreams Deferred
While federal parity laws govern the majority of insurance
plans in the nation, states have their own parity laws and regulators as well.37 Enforcement of the parity laws falls mostly on the
See id. (“The combined reach of MHPAEA and the ACA has affected the
health insurance coverage for more than 170 million people.”).
34 See Pete Early, Guess Who Voted In Favor Of Bill That Every Mental Health
Group Claims Will Put Millions At Risk?, PETEEARLY (Mar. 13, 2017), http://
www.peteearley.com/2017/03/13/guess-who-voted-in-favor-of-bill-that-every-men
tal-health-group-claims-will-put-millions-at-risk/ [https://perma.cc/Y9MB-T4QK]
(“The Republican’s repeal legislation as currently written will end Obamacare’s Medicaid expansion, which covers 1.2 million Americans with serious
mental illness and substance abuse problems, as well as [] scrap baseline coverage requirements.”).
35 See Frank, supra note 26, at 118 (“[T]he federal government must ensure that a fabric of enforcement is in place [including] alignment of federal
and state agencies that monitor and enforce the requirements of MHPAEA.”).
36 See infra text accompanying notes 185–86.
37 Stacey A. Tovino, Reforming State Mental Health Parity Law, 11 HOUS.
J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 455, 459–60 (2012) [hereinafter Tovino, Reforming State
Parity Law] (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (2010) “The business of insurance, and
every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States
which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.”) (“The regulation
of insurance, including health insurance, traditionally has been a state responsibility.”); see also PATRICK J. KENNEDY & STEPHEN FRIED, A COMMON STRUGGLE
254, 360 (2015) (noting that “state laws often influence patient experiences much
more than national mandates” and that parity is basically a state and local issue).
But see Tovino, Reforming State Parity Law, supra, at 459 n.23 (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 1012(b) (2010)) (reserving the right of Congress to pass certain federal legislation, provided that it relates to the business of insurance); 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
33
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shoulders of the states.38 States have taken divergent approaches
to passing parity legislation of their own.39 The twenty-three states
with parity laws vary widely in composition and the degree to
which they are enforced.40 Even despite the legislative progress in
many statehouses across the country, fundamental problems remain.41 These problems include weak or nonexistent parity laws
and under-enforcement of parity laws generally.42 This combination of weak laws and under-enforcement has rippling effects
through the mental healthcare market.43
While state and federal regulators have an easier time ensuring parity of co-payments and deductibles, enforcement of the
parity requirements for the actual delivery of medical services is
lacking.44 New York is one of the few states that now enforces
parity.45 In 2011, the Attorney General (AG) of New York’s Health
Hotline began noticing a pattern of denial of claims by insurers
involving mental health addiction treatments.46 After an AG investigation, it was discovered that some New York insurers denied
(explaining ERISA preempts state insurance laws that relate to employee benefit
plans if the state law is not saved by ERISA’s “savings clause”).
38 See Tovino, Reforming State Parity Law, supra note 37, at 486–87; see
generally KENNEDY & FRIED, supra note 37, at 254 (noting that “state laws often
influences patient experiences much more than national mandates” and that
parity is basically a state and local issue).
39 See Tovino, Reforming State Parity Law, supra note 37, at 487 (“many states
have mental health parity laws that are contrary to or less stringent than federal
law, especially MHPAEA and ACA.”).
40 Michael Ollove, Despite Laws, Mental Health Still Getting Short Shrift,
STATELINE (May 7, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis
/blogs/stateline/2015/5/07/despite-laws-mental-health-still-getting-short-shrift
[https://perma.cc/2NQ9-VH9J]; see also Tovino, Reforming State Parity Law, supra
note 37, at 461–79 (comparing the divergent parity laws in Vermont, Maryland,
Nevada, and Idaho, which offer differing levels of protection).
41 See Tovino, Reforming State Parity Law, supra note 37, at 490–501.
42 See id. at 461–79, 487; Ollove, supra note 40.
43 See, e.g., John Shemo et al., Psychiatric Society of Virginia: District Branch
Report (Mar. 12–13, 2016), http://www.psva.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/spring
/district-branch-report.html [https://perma.cc/U6BU-97L3] (explaining the lack
of parity enforcement leads to “more and more psychiatrists [quitting] insurance
panels, saving the insurance companies even more as patients are not able to
find any ‘network providers’ and the companies reimburse the patient even less
than they reimburse the network provider for using a ‘non-network provider.’”).
44 Ollove, supra note 40.
45 Id.
46 Id.
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nearly half of claims for behavioral health treatment.47 Additionally, there were exclusions for certain types of treatment like
eating disorders and a “fail first” policy before gaining approval
to enter a residential facility.48 In response, the New York AG
reached settlements with five insurance plans for violating state
parity laws.49
In March 2015, the New York AG reached a $900,000 settlement with Beacon Health Options, who was found to deny
behavioral health claims twice as often as other medical or surgical
claims, and four times as often for addiction recovery services.50 The
settlement also required that Beacon Health (formerly ValueOptions) overhaul its claim review process and cooperate with an
ongoing appeal process for members who had been denied claims.51
In addition to the fine imposed, the settlement required Beacon
Health to remove visit limitations for almost all behavioral health
services, provide detailed rationale for denial of claims to allow for
member appeals, reimburse coverage of treatment for diagnoses
listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American
Psychiatric Association (DSM), and file regular compliance reports
with the New York AG.52 The New York AG reached settlements
with four other health plans found to be in noncompliance with parity laws.53 As a result, “45 percent of previously rejected mental
health and substance abuse claims [were] overturned on appeal.”54
Successful enforcement efforts like this show that vigorous enforcement could yield similar benefits on the state and federal levels.
Id.
Id.
49 Id.
50 Press Release, AG Eric Schneiderman, A.G. Schneiderman Announces
Settlement with ValueOptions to End Wrongful Denial of Mental Health and
Substance Abuse Treatment Services (Mar. 5, 2015), https://ag.ny.gov/press-re
lease/ag-schneiderman-announces-settlement-valueoptions-end-wrongful-denial
-mental-health [https://perma.cc/4RG8-W5ML].
51 Id.
52 The settlement included many other provisions to ensure Beacon’s compliance with New York parity laws: it required that Beacon maintain an accurate
online provider directory, conduct full and fair reviews of services that require
preauthorization (e.g., inpatient SUD treatment), remove the “fail-first” standard
previously applied for entry into residential services, and begin integrating medical and behavioral health claims. Id.
53 Ollove, supra note 40.
54 Id.
47
48
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Patterns of discrimination are likely not confined to New
York—they only came to light because of the Attorney General’s
enforcement effort.55 In the words of Patrick Kennedy, “it’s only
logical that there are similar practices [of discrimination] in other
states ... [insurance companies] can’t just be picking on New
Yorkers.”56 Emily Feinstein of CASAColumbia similarly opined,
“I haven’t seen a lot of evidence of states enforcing parity.”57
Even when the laws on the books are adequate, their underenforcement leads to perverse outcomes that can be seen empirically.58 In New York, where an aggressively enforced parity law was
in place, 11 percent (1.8 million people) of the population suffered
from a substance abuse disorder, but only 11 percent of those individuals (198,000 people) received any treatment.59 In comparison,
70 percent of those with hypertension and diabetes received treatment.60 This astonishing figure speaks clearly to the lack of access
to care. Similarly, in a 2015 survey conducted by the National Alliance for Mental Illness, nearly one third of respondents in need of
mental healthcare were denied care, over twice the rate of denial
See id.
Id.
57 Id.
58 Sarah Goodell, Health Policy Brief: Enforcing Mental Health Parity, HEALTH
AFFAIRS (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb201511
09.624272/full/ [https://perma.cc/7V9C-FJ9K] (“Perhaps resulting from this patchwork [of regulatory authorities entrusted with enforcement including DOL,
HHS, and other state insurance commissioners], enforcement on the state and
federal levels has been minimal, with a few exceptions.”); see also Jenny Gold,
Congress tried to fix mental health care in 2008, VOX (Aug. 3, 2015, 7:00 AM),
https://www.vox.com/2015/8/3/9069643/mental-health-parity-lawsuits [https://
perma.cc/Q7SB-9PQN] (according to Henry Harbin, Maryland’s former mental
health director, “insurers are taking advantage of the minimal oversight.” With
little oversight, insurers “micromanage care down to almost nothing.” Past hesitance to “step on the toes” of insurers could partly be explained by the Obama
administration’s fear of angering insurers who were instrumental in helping
the administration pass the Affordable Care Act).
59 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, IN RE VALUEOPTIONS, INC.,
ASSURANCE NO. 14-176, ASSURANCE OF DISCONTINUANCE UNDER EXECUTIVE LAW
SECTION 63, SUBDIVISION 15 AT 3 (2015), https://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/ValueOptions
AOD-FullyExecuted.pdf [https://perma.cc/874N-Z5WA] [hereinafter IN RE VALUE
OPTIONS, INC.].
60 Id.
55
56
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for general medical care.61 There is a clear link between underenforcement of parity laws and lack of access to care.62
The greater problem of access is likely also a result of lack
of mental health resources.63 In 2014, Paul Appelbaum, former
Director of the American Psychiatric Association (APA) lamented
the lack of resources dedicated to mental healthcare, particularly
on the part of the federal government.64
Those who wait on the federal government to jumpstart a
“joint federal-state commitment ... to fund[] the infrastructure of
a care system” will likely be waiting a long time.65 Asking for more
resources, in a more comprehensive way, is a contingent solution
based on the dubious hope that the political will to commit more
resources will suddenly appear.66 Political will seems to be in short
supply these days, particularly since the federal government
National Alliance on Mental Illness, A LONG ROAD AHEAD: ACHIEVING TRUE
PARITY IN MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE USE CARE 4 (2015), https://www
.nami.org/About-NAMI/Publications-Reports/Public-Policy-Reports/A-Long-Road
-Ahead/2015-ALongRoadAhead.pdf [https://perma.cc/PQ9L-97HH] (comparing
survey results from 2720 people in need of mental healthcare with an analysis of
84 health plans in 15 states, focusing on the results of the 1225 respondents
with private insurance who are the subject of the final parity rule of July 1, 2014).
62 See Jonathan Purtle et al., An audience research study to disseminate evidence about comprehensive state mental health parity legislation to US State
policymakers: protocol, 12 IMPLEMENTATION SCI. 1, 2 (2017), https://implementa
tionscience.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/s13012-017-0613-9 [https://
perma.cc/P2B6-9M7P] (finding that insurer’s noncompliance with parity laws
contributes to restricted access to services for “19 [percent] of the US population
with a mental illness”); Goodell, supra note 58, at 4–5.
63 See Paul S. Appelbaum, How to Rebuild America’s Mental Health System,
in 5 Big Steps, GUARDIAN (May 29, 2014, 8:08 PM), https://www.theguardian
.com/commentisfree/2014/may/29/-sp-fix-america-mental-health-system-ideas
[https://perma.cc/35EY-AT4Y].
64 “Today, paying for mental health care is nobody’s responsibility. Insurers
pay as little as possible, often denying claims on flimsy grounds. States have
cut more than $4 [billion] from their mental health budgets in the last six years.
The federal government directly contributes only a tiny amount to supporting
mental health treatment beyond the coverage it provides through Medicare
and Medicaid.” Id.
65 Id.
66 The plea for more federal money is not only contingent, but potentially also
misguided: “Before investing more, we should ensure that a greater percentage
of the existing mega mental health budget goes to serving the most seriously ill.”
JAFFE, supra note 1, at 54–55.
61
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already spends $147 billion annually to fund mental health.67 As
demonstrated by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Service
Administration’s (SAMHSA) Budget for Fiscal Year 2018, additional resources do not seem to be forthcoming; compared to its
2017 Fiscal Year Budget, SAMHSA’s 2018 budget faced cuts of
nearly $400 million.68
Nor is a lack of legislation the fundamental problem.69 On
paper, the laws are often adequate to put state and federal governments in the position to demand parity.70 The problem is realization of this ideal, and mechanisms to ensure that what is written
is carried out.71 The enforcement of state and federal parity laws
needs to begin at the state level.72 Rather than dump more resources on the nonfunctioning system, governments need to recognize how to work smarter with less.73 States need to start holding
“insurers’ feet to [the] fire to make certain they live up [to] their
obligations under the Mental Health Parity Act.” 74 Holding insurers accountable through enforcement of the law, particularly
at the state level where insurance regulation primarily occurs, is
a potential first step in addressing the broader issue of restricted
access to care.75
II. THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR ACCESS: ESTABLISHING A
FUNCTIONAL MENTAL HEALTHCARE MARKET
Resources and access are closely related.76 Lack of resources,
or inefficient allocation of resources, exacerbates barriers to access.77
See id. at 21.
Dept. of Health & Human Servs., HHS FY 2018 Budget in Brief—SAMHSA
(last updated May 23, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/about/budget/fy2018/budget
-in-brief/samhsa/index.html [https://perma.cc/WHT6-3QJ3] (detailing a $374 million decrease in discretionary budget authority for 2018).
69 See Tovino, Reforming State Parity Law, supra note 37, at 461–79; Frank,
supra note 26, at 117–18.
70 See Tovino, Reforming State Parity Law, supra note 37, at 461–82.
71 See Goodell, supra note 58, at 4–5.
72 See Tovino, Reforming State Parity Law, supra note 37 and accompanying text.
73 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
74 See Appelbaum, supra note 63.
75 See id.
76 See id. But see JAFFE, supra note 1, at 54–55.
77 See Appelbaum, supra note 63.
67
68
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Commitment of resources toward enforcement of parity laws could
be a relatively cheap first step to laying the foundation of a functional mental healthcare market.78 Particularly since mental health
resources are under attack at the federal level, and because $147
billion is already being spent by the federal government, shifting
the focus to enforcement where it has the potential to be most
effective—at the local level—is a logical first step.79
As discussed above, insurance companies frequently deny or
undercompensate claims relating to mental health procedures,
which has a twofold effect.80 First, it discourages people from
seeking out care, for fear of not being reimbursed.81 Those who do
receive care may be denied coverage for medically necessary treatment and saddled with unconscionably high bills that their insurance theoretically should cover.82
Second, mental healthcare providers are less likely to accept
private insurance, Medicaid, or Medicare, for fear that they will not
be reimbursed for the procedure.83 A study published in JAMA
78 See Gold, supra note 58. Such implementation could be cheap from an
administrative perspective, but potentially expensive to insurers, who are resistant
to such regulatory scrutiny, and who are large political stakeholders.
79 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
80 See PATRICK J. KENNEDY & STEPHEN FRIED, A COMMON STRUGGLE 254, 360
(2015); John Shemo et al., Psychiatric Society of Virginia District Branch Report to
the Area V Council Meeting, PSYCHIATRIC SOCIETY OF VIRGINIA DISTRICT BRANCH
REPORT (Spring 2016), http://www.psva.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/spring/dis
trict-branch-report.html [https://perma.cc/U6BU-97L3]; Tovino, Reforming State
Parity Law, supra note 37, at 455, 459–60 (2012); Michelle Ollove, Despite Laws,
Mental Health Still Getting Short Shrift, STATELINE (May 7, 2015), http://www
.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/5/07/despite-laws
-mental-health-still-getting-short-shrift [https://perma.cc/2NQ9-VH9J]; supra
notes 37–43 and accompanying text.
81 DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Mental Health: A Report of the Surgeon
General 457 (1999) (“Financial obstacles discourage people from seeking treatment
and from staying in treatment. Repeated surveys have shown that concerns about
the cost of care are among the foremost reasons why people do not seek care.”).
82 See Parity: What’s Next?, THE KENNEDY FORUM (Nov. 7, 2017), https://
thekennedyforum.org/parity-whats-next/; infra notes 168–69 and accompanying
text (detailing a New Jersey woman’s story of taking out a mortgage to fund
inpatient treatment for her two sons, whose medical bills amounted to over
$300,000 combined).
83 Tara F. Bishop et al., Acceptance of Insurance by Psychiatrists and the
Implications for Access to Mental Health Care, 71 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 176, 179
(2013), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapsychiatry/fullarticle/1785174
?version=meter%20at%2015&module=meter-Links&pgtype=article&contentId
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Psychiatry found that only 55 percent of psychiatrists accepted
private insurance.84 This was small compared to the 89 percent
acceptance rate of other medical specialties.85 Rather than fight
with insurance companies to get paid, which is time consuming and
may jeopardize the viability of their practice, many psychiatrists
opt out of the health insurance market entirely and only accept
patients who will pay out-of-pocket.86 For the mental healthcare
patient or consumer, the problem of access is acutely felt.87 It is
very difficult for consumers to find a living psychiatrist within the
insurer’s network, who is accepting new patients.88 In a study of
three major cities, after one round of phone calls, investigators were
able to reach 119 out of 360 psychiatrists (33 percent), and after a
second round of calling, were able to successfully make appointments with ninety-three psychiatrists (26 percent).89 A similar
study in Washington, D.C. found that only fourteen percent of psychiatrists listed in-network were available to schedule new outpatient appointments, the other eighty-six percent either unreachable
or not taking new patients.90 This is a nonfunctioning market.91
By enforcing parity, some stability would be injected into a
dysfunctional market. In Virginia, for instance, the effect of nonenforcement of parity laws is a flight from Virginia by providers.92
=&mediaId=&referrer=https://www.google.com/&priority=true&action=click
&contentCollection=meter-links-click [https://perma.cc/4533-ETQY].
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 See id.
87 See id.
88 See, e.g., Monica Malowney et al., Availability of Outpatient Care from
Psychiatrists: A Simulated-Patient Study in Three U.S. Cities, 66 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVS. 94, 94–96 (2015), http://ps.psychiatryonline.org/doi/pdf/10.1176/appi.ps
.201400051 [https://perma.cc/89RX-NWGB] (conducting a phone survey in Boston,
Chicago, and Houston of all Blue Cross Blue Shield providers in the cities to
determine the extent of availability of in-network providers).
89 Id.
90 Majority of Psychiatrists Listed in DC Health Insurance Exchange Network Not Available For New Patient Appointments, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N
(May 16, 2016), https://www.psychiatry.org/newsroom/news-releases/majority
-of-psychiatrists-listed-in-dc-health-insurance-exchange-network-not-available
-for-new-patient-appointments [https://perma.cc/LEJ8-BVRM].
91 See id.
92 John Shemo, American Psychiatric Association Assembly Meeting, PSYCHIATRIC SOC’Y OF VA NEWS, Winter 2015, at 19, http://www.psva.org/wp-con
tent/uploads/2015/12/PSV_VA_News_Winter2015_web1.pdf [https://perma.cc
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Knowing that they will not be reimbursed by insurance companies
for the services they render, psychiatrists often either refuse to
accept private insurance or flee from the state altogether.93 When
insurance companies fail to reimburse psychiatric procedures at
the same rate as other medical procedures, the effect is to depress
wages for psychiatrists.94 Enforcing parity provisions would address the brain-drain problem in states like Virginia.95 It would also
work toward stabilizing a market for care by getting providers on
board and creating incentives for them to operate in the market,
rather than outside of it.96
Insurers play a key role in this conversation.97 Many likely
ignore the laws on the books and get away with it.98 Anecdotal
evidence of noncompliance is often all that is available, however,
because insurers refuse to release information about the rates at
which they reimburse, reasoning that the information is proprietary.99
A recent survey of forty-two million patients from 2013 to
2015 confirms that there are significant disparities between mental
/WGW9-AKAB] (detailing the flight of nearly eighty percent of psychiatric residency trainees from Virginia).
93 Id. (“This [flight from Virginia] is in part due to the extremely low insurance reimbursement schedules for psychiatrists in Virginia.”).
94 Jennifer Nelson, Talk is cheap: How insurance changed the face of psychiatry, INSURE (Feb. 6, 2013) (asserting that “doctors can’t afford to go into
psychiatry because of [low] insurance reimbursement [rates] .... [I]t is the lowest
paying field for doctors and, with the cost of additional medical school for specialization, it isn’t worth it.” In addition, “mental health professionals have arguably the worst reimbursements in health care, and many are leaving the field
or working outside of the health care insurance system.”).
95 See Shemo, supra note 92, at 19.
96 See Goodell, supra note 58, at 5.
97 See Gold, supra note 58.
98 Id. (“[D]emonstrating that an insurer has violated parity rules requires
a detailed analysis of a plan’s mental health and medical benefits .... [While]
the law requires that insurers disclose that information, critics say they often
do not comply.” Indeed, “virtually no insurers will release documents.”); Despite
Federal Law, Some Insurance Exchange Plans Offer Unequal Coverage for Mental
Health, JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH (Mar. 2, 2015),
https://www.jhsph.edu/news/news-releases/2015/despite-federal-law-some-insur
ance-exchange-plans-offer-unequal-coverage-for-mental-health.html [https://
perma.cc/K3TV-VMLS] (detailing how one quarter of plans sold on Obamacare
exchanges in two states appeared to violate federal parity laws).
99 See Gold, supra note 58.
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and physical healthcare reimbursement rates.100 This study demonstrated that both primary and specialty care providers received
higher reimbursement rates than did behavioral health providers
for comparable services.101 In addition, the study found that mental
health patients used out-of-network providers substantially more
often than did medical/surgical care patients.102 In 2015, the proportion of behavioral healthcare provided out-of-network was 3.6 to
5.8 times higher than was the proportion of medical/surgical care.103
The two findings are likely closely related: lower reimbursement
rates offered to mental health providers likely lead to providers not
opting in to a health plan’s network, thus creating difficulty for patients looking for scarce in-network mental health providers.104
Demonstrating the abstract concepts described above is an
exchange between Anthem Virginia and Dr. John Shemo, a Virginia provider and former director of the Psychiatric Society of
Virginia.105 In the letters between Dr. Shemo and the Anthem
representative, Dr. Shemo complains about Anthem’s discriminatory practice of denying reimbursement for certain procedure
STEPHEN P. MELEK ET AL., ADDICTION AND MENTAL HEALTH VS. PHYSICAL
HEALTH: ANALYZING DISPARITIES IN NETWORK USE AND PROVIDER REIMBURSEMENT RATES 1 (2017), http://www.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/insight/2017/NQ
100

TLDisparityAnalysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5U7-VVLZ].
101 Across the country, when compared to behavioral health providers, primary
care providers received a 20.7 to 22 percent higher average reimbursement rate,
while specialists received a 17.1 to 19.1 percent higher rate. Id. at 2. In Virginia
from 2013 to 2015, primary care reimbursement rates were on average 39.53
percent higher than behavioral reimbursement rates, while average specialist
rates were 32.26 percent higher. See id. at apps. J–L.
102 The study found that “[o]ut-of-network utilization for behavioral care
nearly doubled in the inpatient setting, increasing from 9.6 [percent] to 16.7
[percent], and more than doubled in the outpatient facility setting, increasing
from 15.6 [percent] to 31.6 [percent] between 2013 and 2015.” Out-of-network behavioral healthcare utilization is much higher when compared to medical/surgical
out-of-network patient utilization, which consistently hovered between 3.4 and 4
percent for inpatient facilities and between 5.3 and 5.6 percent for outpatient
facilities. Id. at 3–4.
103 Id. at 3.
104 Id. at 2–3.
105 Letter from John Shemo, Med. Director, Psychiatric Alliance of the Blue
Ridge, to Anthony L. Pelonero, Med. Director, Behavioral Health Care, Anthem
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va. (July 15, 2013), http://www.psva.org/wp-content
/uploads/2013/11/Letter_Shemo_Request_15Jul13.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9GT
-9MQB] [hereinafter Shemo Letter].
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codes.106 Anthem justified its denial of Dr. Shemo’s reimbursement request by stating that his “diagnosis and procedure codes
[were] not ‘compatible.’”107 Such an exchange demonstrates Dr.
Shemo’s frustration in dealing with Anthem. More importantly, it
demonstrates the difficulties of running a business dependent upon
such reimbursements.108 For psychiatrists like Dr. Shemo, conducting an hour worth of treatment for less than $50 is not justifiable.109
As the Milliman study demonstrates, disparate insurance company
reimbursement practices likely contribute to psychiatrists’ decision
not to opt in to health plans.110
The insurance company’s response is instructive as well.111
In response, Dr. Anthony Pelonero of Anthem justifies the insurance company’s denial:
Anthem’s reimbursement rates for psychiatrists and other physicians are market driven and reflect a myriad of factors, including
the fact that psychiatrists, on average, have a lower cost structure
than most other physicians. Parity requires the use of comparable processes, strategies, evidentiary standards, and other factors, for mental health benefits and medical/surgical benefits,
and it requires that these factors are applied in a comparably
stringent manner. It does not require that the reimbursement
rates for evaluation and management services performed by psychiatrists be the same.112

See id.
See id. (alteration in original) (“Anthem sees fit to ‘allow’ only $49.96
for this hour of service, $19.96 from Anthem and $30.00 from the patient. They
are reimbursing the 99213 code but are denying the accompanying 90836 code in
its entirety, saying that the diagnosis and procedure codes are not ‘compatible.’
The diagnosis codes used are directly from the DSM-IV and similar codes are in
the DSM-5. Thus, they are by definition psychiatric diagnosis codes used with
psychiatric procedure codes.”).
108 See id.; see also Shemo, supra note 92 (explaining that Anthem Blue
Cross/Blue Shield, the largest insurer in Virginia, “reimburses for procedure
codes 99213/90836 and 99214/90836 at less than half of the Medicare reimbursement rates”).
109 Shemo Letter, supra note 105.
110 See MELEK ET AL., supra note 100, at 2–3.
111 Letter from Anthony L. Pelonero, Med. Director, Behavioral Health Care,
Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., to John Shemo, Med. Director, Psychiatric Alliance of the Blue Ridge (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.psva.org/wp-con
tent/uploads/2013/11/Letter_Pelonero_Response_15Jul13_12Sep13.pdf [https://
perma.cc/62E3-YVR9] [hereinafter Pelonero Letter].
112 Id.
106
107

2019]

A MISSING KEY IN HEALTHCARE ACCESS

567

Regardless of the legal validity of this position, one thing
is clear: the provider will not be reimbursed at actual parity, and
the insurance company is not operating outside of the law.113
Anthem’s justification is an economic one.114 A psychiatrist’s cost
structure is not the same as that of most ordinary physicians, and
so the insurance company is not required to reimburse at the same
rate.115 An investigation into the state legislative scheme will yield
an answer on whether this is correct or not.116 Nevertheless, the
limiting effect of such an approach on access to treatment is clear.117
This trend can be seen on the micro-level as well. When one of
Virginia’s largest insurers frequently reimburses providers at a
fraction of the rate of other comparable procedures, this disincentivizes providers from accepting that insurance, which creates
downward pressure on the wages of psychiatrists, and so disincentivizes psychiatrists from operating in the market.118
Even assuming the costs of enforcing parity would be out
of step with the services rendered, the insurance company clearly
misses the broader individual, familial, and societal impacts of its
actions.119 There are extreme negative externalities in the fallout from the lack of access to adequate mental health services.120
Ultimately, by deferring necessary treatment, insurers may also
be shooting themselves in the foot.121 Some estimates say that
the societal costs that result from inadequate treatment exceed
$100 billion per year.122 These costs are likely not the foremost
See id.
See id.
115 See id.
116 See infra Part III; see also Gold, supra note 58 (insurers more often require preauthorization for psychiatric doctor visits, have “fail first” policies for
access to inpatient care, and require determinations of “medical necessity”
before patients are covered for appropriate levels of care).
117 See, e.g., Bishop et al., supra note 83, at 176–80.
118 See MELEK ET AL., supra note 100, at 2–3; Shemo, supra note 92; Pelonero
Letter, supra note 111; Shemo Letter, supra note 105; see also supra notes 108–12
and accompanying text.
119 See Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal, supra note 4.
120 Id.
121 See, e.g., Gold, supra note 58 (“The irony in all this is that [the insurer]
fights tooth and nail to dole out care for my son. But had they allowed him upfront
to get the care he needed, he might not have ended up back in the hospital, which
they had to pay for.”) (alteration in original).
122 Id.
113
114
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concern of insurance companies, who have their shareholders and
bottom line to worry about.123 Some studies suggest, however, that
by not adequately treating mental health, the cost that insurance
companies pay for physical treatments goes up as well.124 This
phenomenon is known as the offset effect.125
Insurance companies justify not offering mental health and
SUD benefits at parity by claiming that doing so will raise costs
for insurers.126 However, many studies refute this claim.127 One
such study compared patients diagnosed with depression to those
without it and found that untreated, depressed patients have higher
medical costs on average, “associated with a twofold increase in
use of health services.”128 The greater utilization of medical services by depressed patients was found to be more costly than the
costs associated with treating the depression itself.129
In a similar 2009 study, 14,902 Medicare beneficiaries with
either diabetes, congestive heart failure, or both were split into
three groups: those diagnosed with depression, those not officially
diagnosed but who screened positive, and those who were not depressed.130 Those diagnosed with depression incurred $22,960 in
total costs over one year on average, with mental healthcare costs
accounting for less than 2 percent of total health costs.131 By comparison, those without depression had costs of $11,956 per year,
and those with possible depression had costs of $14,365.132 Higher
Medicare co-payments for outpatient mental healthcare at the
time (50 percent co-pay for outpatient mental versus 20 percent
for outpatient physical healthcare at the time of the study) were
likely an obstacle for depressed patients that stopped them from
See Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal, supra note 4, at 9–13.
See id. at 10–32.
125 See id. at 29 n.195.
126 See id. at 4.
127 See id. at 15–27.
128 See id. at 15 (citing Greg E. Simon et al., Health Care Costs of Primary
Care Patients with Recognized Depression, 52 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 850,
850–54 (1995)).
129 See id. at 16.
130 See id. at 18–20 (citing Jürgen Unützer et al., Healthcare Costs Associated with Depression in Medically Ill Fee-for-Service Medicare Participants, 57
J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC. 506 (2009)).
131 Id. at 19.
132 Id.
123
124
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seeking outpatient mental health treatment entirely.133 The study
concluded that increased utilization of evidence-based depression
care could generate long-term cost savings.134 Instead of increased
costs, these studies show that shifting resources to needed mental
health treatment may actually generate cost savings for insurers
when taking account of total healthcare costs.135
Another study found that each dollar invested in fullcontinuum and partial-continuum addiction care generated returns
that were 9.7 and 23.3 times their baseline investments, respectively.136 The study concluded that both types of “addiction care
can generate positive and significant net benefits to society.”137
Increased mental health and substance abuse treatment, when
medically necessary, can generate net economic benefits contrary
to the claims of insurers; policy makers should take notice.138
III. VIRGINIA’S LEGISLATIVE SCHEME
IN THE NATIONAL CONTEXT
A. Virginia’s Lack of Enforcement Weakens an Otherwise
Strong Law
Virginia, when compared to other states, has a typical state
mental health parity law.139 The law first specifies that group and
individual health insurance coverage “shall provide mental health
and substance use disorder benefits.”140 The Virginia law goes beyond the MHPAEA, insofar as it mandates that a specified subclass
of insurers offer mental health and substance abuse benefits.141
This is referred to as a “mandated benefit” law.142
Id.
Id. at 19–20.
135 See id.
136 Id. at 22 (full-continuum care cost averaged $2,530 and generated economic benefits of $20,639, while partial-continuum average cost was $1,138 with
$12,130 average economic benefits).
137 Id.
138 See generally Purtle et al., supra note 62.
139 VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3412.1 (West 2017).
140 Id. § 38.2-3412.1(B).
141 Id.; see Wellstone & Domenici, supra note 21.
142 See Tovino, Reforming State Parity Law, supra note 37, at 463–64 (“Mandated benefit laws require all health insurance plans to include the mandated
133
134
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The types of insurers that fall into the subclass that must
offer mental health benefits include “group and individual health
insurance coverage,” excepting grandfathered plans in the small
group market, which have explicit limitations on the extent of coverage for inpatient and outpatient services available.143 Virginia
law similarly requires that state employee health plans offer coverage for a “biologically based mental illness.”144
Curiously, section 38.2-3412.1 contains no such reference
to “biologically based mental illness,” but defines “mental health
services,” as those benefits “for mental health conditions as defined under the terms of the health benefit plan ... [with any
condition defined therein] to be consistent with generally recognized
independent standards of current medical practice.”145 This raises
the question: what is the scope of a “mental health condition”? In
practice, the scope is whatever the insurance plan chooses to define
it as, so long as the definition is consistent with current standards of
medical practice.146 Contrast this definition with Vermont’s parity law, which defines “mental health condition” as inclusive of
“all mental illnesses listed in the mental disorders section of the
benefit ... regardless of whether a particular insured requires or believes she will
require the benefit.”).
143 § 38.2-3412.1(B)–(D) (limiting inpatient care in grandfathered small group
plans to twenty days for adults per year and twenty-five days for children, allowing for conversion of ten days of inpatient care to fifteen days of partial hospitalization benefit; and providing that such plans provide a minimum of twenty
outpatient treatment visits for adults and children (excluding medication management visits), providing minimum levels of co-insurance coverage of 50 percent
to outpatient visits beyond the first five visits, and providing that if all covered
expenses for an outpatient visit or substance abuse treatment apply toward any
deductible required by policy or contract, such visit shall not count toward the
outpatient benefit maximum).
144 VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-2818(B)(17) (West 2017) (defining “biologically based
mental illness” as “any mental or nervous condition caused by a biological disorder
of the brain that results in a clinically significant syndrome that substantially
limits the person’s functioning,” specifically including “schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, panic disorder,
obsessive-compulsive disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, autism,
and drug and alcoholism addiction”).
145 VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3412.1(A) (West 2017) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
146 See id.
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current edition of the [International Classification of Disease].”147
The Vermont law thus requires insurance plans to cover the full
range of neurological, psychiatric, substance abuse, developmental,
and intellectual disorders.148 The Virginia law is nowhere near
as comprehensive in scope in comparison.149 This could potentially give Virginia insurers an escape hatch through which they
could avoid covering certain legitimate mental health conditions
by not including them in the terms of the health benefit plan.150
Nevertheless, the Virginia law specifically tethers itself to
the MHPAEA, requiring that the benefits provided for mental
health and substance use disorders be in parity with the medical
and surgical benefits contained in a plan’s coverage, in accordance
with the MHPAEA.151 By adopting the financial requirements and
treatment limitations of the MHPAEA for all but grandfathered
small group plans, and mandating that plans offer mental health
benefits, the Virginia parity law apparently goes a step beyond
the federal law.152 In theory, the tools are present for compliance
with the parity laws, and yet reality tells a different story entirely.153 While it is possible that insurers manage to get out of
covering mental health conditions by simply not including certain conditions in the terms of their plans, it is unclear to what
extent this potential loophole is exploited.154 In Virginia, the law
itself is not lacking.155 Instead, lack of enforcement is why the
benefits of Virginia’s parity law are not realized.156
See Tovino, Reforming State Parity Law, supra note 37, at 464–65.
See id.
149 See id.
150 See MELEK ET AL., supra note 100, at 2–4; Shemo Letter, supra note 105;
see also supra notes 102–05.
151 VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3412.1(B) (West 2017); see Wellstone & Domenici,
supra note 21.
152 See § 38.2-3412.1(B).
153 See MELEK ET AL., supra note 100, at 2–3; Shemo, supra note 92; Pelonero
Letter, supra note 111; Shemo Letter, supra note 105; see also supra notes 108–12
and accompanying text.
154 See MELEK ET AL., supra note 100, at 2–3; Shemo, supra note 92; Pelonero
Letter, supra note 111; Shemo Letter, supra note 105; see also supra notes 108–12
and accompanying text.
155 See § 38.2-3412.1.
156 See id.
147
148
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B. Recent Developments: Executive Recognition that Enforcement
of Parity Laws for Substance Use Disorders Needs to Be on the
State and Federal Levels
In response to an ever-worsening opioid crisis across New
Jersey, former Governor Chris Christie called for the passage of
a bill restricting the ability of insurance companies to deny coverage for inpatient and outpatient addiction treatment.157 The bill,
signed into law on February 15, 2017, mandates that a “hospital
service corporation contract that provides ... benefits ... shall provide
unlimited benefits for inpatient and outpatient treatment of substance use disorder at in-network facilities.”158 Moreover, those
diagnosed with a SUD have treatment coverage “for the first 180
days per plan year ... when determined medically necessary by the
covered person’s physician, psychologist or psychiatrist without
imposition of any prior authorization or other prospective utilization management requirements.”159 Importantly, “the first 28
days of an inpatient stay during each plan year shall be provided
without any retrospective review or concurrent review of medical
necessity ...” by the insurer or hospital providing care, and treatment for SUDs must be covered by carriers “to the same extent as
for any other medical condition covered under the contract,” that
is without increased co-pays, deductibles, or co-insurance.160 In a
promising signal of its intent, the law also emboldens the New
Jersey Attorney General’s Office to oversee administration of the
law and authorizes punishment for any violations resulting from
“fraud, abuse, waste, and mistreatment of covered persons.”161
See Sarah Frostenson, New Jersey Just Passed One of the Most Aggressive
Laws to Combat the Opioid Epidemic, VOX (Feb. 15, 2017, 4:30 PM) (noting that
prior to passage of the law, Governor Christie called for such legislation in his
State of the State address on January 10, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy
-and-politics/2017/2/15/14506434/republicans-democrats-opioid-abuse-bipartisan
[https://perma.cc/B9GM-ACS3].
158 See 2017 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 1 (West) (codified as amended at N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 17:48-6nn(a) (2017)).
159 Id. § 17:48-6nn(b) (no “prior authorization or other prospective utilization management requirements.”); id. § 17:48-6nn(c) (“[no] pre-payment of medical expenses during this 180 day in excess of applicable co-payment, deductible,
or co-insurance under the contract”).
160 Id. §§ 17:48-6nn(e)–(f) (“medical necessity shall be as determined by the
covered person’s physician”); id. § 17:48-6nn(k).
161 Id. § 17:48-6nn(n).
157
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By putting such explicit pressure on insurance companies,
this represents the strongest legislative reform in the nation addressing access to substance abuse treatment.162 Since the New
Jersey law is specifically targeted at substance abuse treatment,
the legislative and administrative fixes in New Jersey presumably do not extend to other forms of mental healthcare treatment.163
Nonetheless, New Jersey’s bold posture serves as an example of
what is possible for enforcement.164 The legislative and regulatory
posture is being backed up by a concerted effort to sign contracts
with existing acute-care general hospitals in New Jersey and build
new private inpatient hospitals, adding nearly 900 psychiatric and
drug treatment beds throughout New Jersey by 2019.165 After all,
legislative and regulatory fixes are great, but if there are not
enough providers or beds to offer services, than yelling about parity will only go so far, because inadequate resources will ultimately limit access due to scarcity.166
Former Governor Christie has channeled his efforts in
New Jersey to the national level in his capacity as the Chairman
of the President’s Commission on Combating Drug Addiction and
the Opioid Crisis.167 During his remarks on November 1, 2017,
before the Commission, then-Governor Christie responded to a
New Jersey woman, Roxanne Schwartz, who gave heartbreaking
testimony about her need to pay over $300,000 out-of-pocket to get
her two sons inpatient treatment for their addictions.168 Even
PARTNERSHIP FOR A DRUG-FREE NEW JERSEY, Governor Christie Signs
America’s Strongest Drug Addiction and Treatment Reform Legislation (Feb. 15,
2017), http://www.drugfreenj.org/news/governor-christie-signs-americas-strongest
-drug-addiction-treatment-reform-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/A4AR-M9JU].
163 See Frostenson, supra note 157 and accompanying text.
164 See id.
165 Susan K. Livio, Christie Says Promise on Addiction, Mental Health Treatment Coming True in 2019, NJ (Nov. 18, 2017), http://www.nj.com/politics/index
.ssf/2017/11/nj_will_add_900_new_addiction_and_mental_health_tr.html [https://
perma.cc/2LXA-UPX5].
166 See id.
167 See The President’s Commission on Combating Drug Addiction and the
Opioid Crisis, Final Report, at 5, 7 (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov
/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/Final_Report__11-2-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc
/8RL9-Z96R] [hereinafter The President’s Commission].
168 The White House, Meeting of the President’s Commission on Combating Drug Addiction and Opioid Crisis [5th and final meeting] (Nov. 1, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/featured-videos/video/2017/11/01/meeting-presidents
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after Roxanne filed seven appeals to her insurance company, the
insurers refused to reimburse her.169
While the newly passed New Jersey law would have prevented insurance companies from behaving in such a way, Christie
noted that New Jersey “is only able to regulate 30 [percent] of
the health insurance plans in our state” with the other seventy percent of plans regulated by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL).170
While DOL is responsible for regulating the majority of health
insurance plans in the country, it lacks the enforcement authority
necessary to hold insurers accountable.171
C. The President’s Commission Final Report and its
Recommendations for Action Going Forward
The Commission’s Recommendations recognize the importance of parity in resolving the problem of access to care. 172 One
of the most important Recommendations, number 35, recommends
that “Congress provide DOL increased authority to levy monetary
penalties on insurers and funders, and permit DOL to launch investigations of health insurers independently for parity violations.”173 While the MHPAEA has been on the books since 2008,
and the final rules implementing it were published in November
2013, the would-be enforcer, the DOL, has lacked the ability to
enforce the law.174 That there has been formal recognition of the
shocking lack of teeth in implementing the MHPAEA, is a positive sign for reform at the federal level.175
Recommendation 34 also recognizes the concern of John
Shemo discussed in Part II, supra, about the disparate levels of
reimbursement for SUD treatment providers.176 Indeed, because
-commission-combating-drug-addiction-and-opioid [https://perma.cc/U2EQ-3XAR]
[hereinafter President’s Commission Video].
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 See The President’s Commission, supra note 167, at 9.
172 See id. at 6.
173 Id. at 72.
174 See id. at 9.
175 See id. at 71.
176 See id. at 70 (“Lack of sufficient reimbursement impedes the ability of
professionals and practices to implement high-quality and consistent care, including but not limited to the use of EHRs, the implementation of evidence-based
practices, and the routine use of quality metrics.”).
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of the disparate rates of reimbursement, “many practitioners no
longer take insurance, diminishing access to care even when there
appears to be sufficient capacity.”177 To remedy this, the Commission recommends that HHS “review and modify [the] rate-setting”
process “to better cover the true costs of providing SUD treatment for both inpatient psychiatric facility and outpatient provider
rates.”178 This again is a sound proposal, given the downward pressure on access that disparate reimbursement practices have.179
Another relevant portion of the final report, Recommendation 36, recognizes the common pitfalls that bedevil enforcement of
the parity laws on the state and federal levels.180 While monitoring
parity compliance for co-pays and deductibles may be a relatively
simple task, other “non-quantitative treatment limitations”
(NQTLs) are not so simple to comply with, and as a result often
are not adhered to.181 NQTLs include “stringent prior authorization and medical necessity requirements.”182 The Commission recommends that HHS review the clinical guidelines to support NQTL
parity requirements, and that federal and state regulators use a
standard tool requiring “health plans to document and disclose their
compliance ....”183 Again, this is a powerful suggestion. Although
it is one that may be more difficult to implement given the need
for more rigorous regulatory oversight, which remains elusive.184
These suggested regulatory and legislative interventions are
apparently directed specifically at substance abuse treatment, but
likely include the broader array of mental health treatments as
well.185 This is heartening because it represents the first time that
parity enforcement is a top priority at the highest level of government, that is with President Trump.186 If the breakdown of state
versus federally administered health plans across the nation is
like that of New Jersey, that is with 70 percent of plans subject to
Id.
Id. at 15.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 72.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 72.
183 Id.
184 See Goodell, supra note 58 and accompanying text.
185 See The President’s Commission, supra note 167, at 71.
186 See Parity: What’s Next?, supra note 82, at 3.
177
178

576 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:549
federal parity laws, then increased federal attention to enforcement
is critical to access and could potentially cut administrative costs.187
Potentially, however, there may be a problem of give-andtake. Given that the opioid crisis is currently at the forefront of
policymakers’ minds, it is possible that other mental health patients may be neglected.188 As seen in the case of New Jersey, the
rigorous new law passed last year is specifically tailored to address
the needs of those who require substance abuse treatment, but does
not extend similar protections to those who suffer from serious mental illnesses and who may face the same barriers to treatment.189
It remains to be seen whether the laudable ends of the New
Jersey law are realized, and whether there is a positive spillover
to other mentally ill patients.190 When resources are tight however, it could be that there are winners and losers from a shift in
resources.191 This is not to diminish Governor Christie’s efforts.
The former Governor did well to increase access for SUD patients
both legislatively and by physically increasing access to additional hospital beds.192 This is the kind of activity that needs to
happen across the country.193 Giving DOL the authority to monitor compliance with the parity laws, and thus giving teeth to the
MHPAEA, would be a critical step in increasing access to mental
healthcare across the country.194
CONCLUSION
For too long those with serious mental illness have been
denied access to crucial care.195 The state of mental healthcare is
one where finding a provider is a small miracle, and denial of
coverage is commonplace.196 This creates a barrier to access that
See President’s Commission Video, supra note 168.
See Frostenson, supra note 157 and accompanying text.
189 See id.
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191 See JAFFE, supra note 1, at 55.
192 See PARTNERSHIP FOR A DRUG-FREE NEW JERSEY, supra note 162, at 1.
193 See Frostenson, supra note 157, at 5.
194 See The President’s Commission, supra note 167, at 71.
195 See JAFFE, supra note 1, at 54 (providing statistics on lack of access to
medical care and the tragic effects).
196 See National Alliance on Mental Illness, supra note 61, at 2 and accompanying text.
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can seem insurmountable. Often the perpetrators of these denials,
insurance companies, are legally required to cover mental health
patients at parity with other procedures, but fail to do so.197 A
reassessment of the entire mental healthcare system is necessary
to cure these longstanding deficiencies.198
One of the foremost obstacles to access is under-enforcement
of parity laws.199 Particularly at the state level, where much of
insurance regulation occurs, enforcement of parity laws could represent a first step toward stabilizing a nonfunctioning market.200
The aggressive enforcement actions of the New York AG show
the potential of parity laws and should be emulated in other
states.201 In a sector where resources are tight, doing more with
less is necessary.202
Ramped up enforcement activity is also needed on the federal level. In some states, like New Jersey, the DOL is responsible
for regulating the majority of the state’s insurance plans.203 It is
promising that the federal government is starting to recognize the
importance of giving federal regulators the tools necessary to enforce the law.204 The President’s Commission on Combating Drug
Addiction and the Opioid Crisis holds promise of reform for substance use disorders, but it remains to be seen how exactly this
plays out for mental health generally.205
In the end, this is a human rights issue that has been ignored for too long at the pain and expense of too many. Providers
currently have the perverse incentive to operate outside of the
dysfunctional insurance market.206 A shakeup is needed of the
current regime, and a focus on working to more effectively utilize the laws that exist would be a good first step toward increasing
access.
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